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In the framework of the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on complex networks, we
investigate the possibility that the average level of cooperation shows hysteresis under quasi-static variations of
a model parameter (the “temptation to defect”). Under the “discrete replicator” strategy updating rule, for both
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi and Baraba´si-Albert graphs we observe cooperation hysteresis cycles provided one reaches tipping
point values of the parameter; otherwise, perfect reversibility is obtained. The selective fixation of cooperation
at certain nodes and its organization in cooperator clusters, that are surrounded by fluctuating strategists, allows
the rationalization of the “lagging behind” behavior observed.
INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory [1] provides with an elegant
mathematical description of how Darwinian natural selection
among strategies (representing phenotypes) takes place when
the reproductive success of individuals (and thus the future
abundance of phenotypes) depends on the current strategic
composition of the population (frequency-dependent fitness)
[2–4]. One of the most studied challenges to the explanatory
power of evolutionary game dynamics is the understanding of
the evolutionary survival of cooperative behavior among un-
related individuals that is observed even when selfish actions
provide higher short-term benefits.
Perhaps the best suited mathematical model to describe the
puzzle of how cooperation survives is the Prisoner’s Dilemma
(PD) game. This game, originally introduced by M.M. Flood
and G.J. Savage [5], is a two-players-two-strategies game, in
which each player chooses one of the two available strate-
gies: cooperation (C) or defection (D). A cooperator earns
R (reward) when playing with a cooperator, and a payoff S
(sucker’s payoff) when playing with a defector, while a defec-
tor earns P (punishment) when playing with a defector, and T
(temptation to defect) against a cooperator. When the order-
ing of the payoffs is T > R > P > S, the game is strictly
speaking a PD. When T > R > S > P the situation is called
Snowdrift Game (SG), also known as Hawks-and-Doves or
Chicken [6]. In this work we focus on a variant of the PD
game called weak Prisoner’s Dilemma, placed in its bound-
ary with respect to SG, that is T > R > P = S. In a PD
(including weak variant), whatever the opponent’s strategy is,
the payoff is never higher for cooperation, and a rational agent
should choose defection. Still, two cooperator agents receive
higher payoff (2R) than two defector ones (2P ), which leads
to social dilemma.
On the other hand, recent discoveries on the interaction ar-
chitecture of biological, technological and social systems have
shown that this structure has important consequences for their
dynamical behavior and their associated critical phenomena
[7, 8]. In particular, the dynamical features observed for het-
erogeneous, scale-free (SF) networks are often different from
those for homogeneous networks [9, 10]. This difference is
rooted in the presence of highly connected nodes. Motivated
by the aforementioned results, studies of evolutionary game
theory models on heterogeneous networks have attracted a
great attention in the last few years [11–13]. In particular,
issues concerning the role that social structure plays in the
success of cooperative behavior have been extensively studied
in the context of the PD game [14–22]. The results obtained
indicate that the heterogeneous connectivity patterns charac-
teristic of SF networks might support cooperation, although it
has been recently reported that when humans play a PD game,
networks do not play a role [23]. The promotion of cooper-
ation when the payoff differences determine the evolution of
strategies is understood by the presence of highly connected
nodes (the hubs) whose large number of connections provides
them with high benefits and then a high imitation power. Thus,
when playing as cooperators neighboring agents easily imi-
tate their cooperative strategy. This imitation reinforces the
benefits accumulated by the cooperator hubs thus creating a
positive feedback mechanism that enhances the cooperation
across the whole system.
The asymptotic levels of average cooperation on random
networks (as function of game’s parameters) were determined
to be reasonably robust versus variation of random initial con-
ditions with different initial proportion of cooperators [19].
Though this might seem to suggest that, under slow (com-
pared to evolutionary scales) parameter variation, the coop-
eration levels reached on a network are independent of the
particular history of parameters’ change, it is unclear that it
should be so, because of the likelihood of multiplicity of mi-
croscopic asymptotic states, given the disordered nature of the
social contacts structure, that could produce hysteresis-like
behaviors. We address here the question about the possibil-
ity of hysteresis of the cooperation on complex network under
quasi-static variation of game’s parameters.
2THE MODEL
Provided the relative selective advantage among two indi-
viduals depends on their payoff’s difference (see below), we
can normalize without loss of generality the pay-off matrix
taking R = 1 and fix the punishment P = 0. We will
also consider here that the sucker’s payoff is S = 0, namely,
the weak prisoner’s dilemma, so that both strategies perform
equally against a defector. Then only one parameter, the
“temptation to defect”, T = b > 1 is a system variable.
In this study we implement the following replication mech-
anism: At each time step, each agent i plays once with each
one of its neighbors (i.e. agents connected to i) and accu-
mulates the obtained payoffs, Pi. After that, the individuals,
i, update synchronously their strategies choosing a neighbor
j at random, and comparing their respective payoffs Pi and
Pj . If Pi ≥ Pj , nothing happens and i preserves its strat-
egy. Otherwise, if Pj > Pi, i adopts the strategy of its neigh-
bor j with probability Πji = η(Pj − Pi). Next, all payoffs
are reset to zero. Here, η is a positive real number, related
to the characteristic inverse time scale: the larger it is, the
faster evolution takes place. We consider that players and
connections between them are given by a fixed graph where
agents are represented by nodes, and a link between nodes in-
dicates that they interact. We choose here the maximum value
of η that preserves the probabilistic character of Πji, that is,
η = (max{ki, kj}b)
−1
, where ki is the number of neighbors
of agent i (connectivity or degree). This choice, introduced
in [15], slows down the invasion processes from or to highly
connected nodes (hubs), with respect to the rate of invasion
processes between poorly connected nodes.
Our aim is the study of the reversible (or irreversible) char-
acter of cooperation level c under the variation of the tempta-
tion to defect parameter b, where c is defined as the number of
cooperator nodes divided by the total population c = Nc/N .
In order to study the system’s behavior, we choose an initial
value of b = b0 such that the asymptotic cooperation value c
is close to a half: c(b0) ≃ 0.5. Once the system has reached a
stationary state, we decrease b in a quasi-static way, that is, in
steps ∆b < 0 small enough to ensure that the system remains
very close to equilibrium. Along this process, we compute the
stationary value of cooperation c(b) for each value of b. To
avoid getting stuck in the absorbing states we deal with large
enough network sizes (N > 105), considering that fluctua-
tions decrease according to the square root of the system size.
Once the system has almost reached the absorbing state c = 0,
we reverse the sign of the increase in b, i.e. ∆b > 0, to almost
reach the other absorbing state c = 1, and then again decrease
b to complete the cycle. To study the influence of network
topology in the reversibility of the process, we consider three
different network models: Random Regular Graphs (RRG),
Erdo¨s- Re´nyi and Scale-free networks, though we will only
show here the results for the last two types of graphs. RRG
(i.e., random networks with fixed degree k, which means that
every node has the same number of neighbors) always show
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FIG. 1: (color online) Cooperation level 〈c〉 versus the temptation to
defect b averaged over 103 ER networks (solid lines) and envelopes
(pointed lines). Red lines represent semicycles with increasing b and
blue lines represent semicycles with decreasing b. The network size
is N = 1.2× 105. See the text for further details.
complete reversibility. This seems to imply that, although ran-
domness is present in RRG, a non-zero variance in the degree
distribution is a necessary condition for the observation of ir-
reversible behavior.
ERD ¨OS-R ´ENYI NETWORKS
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi (ER) networks are random graphs character-
ized by a binomial degree distribution (or a Poisson distribu-
tion for large networks). To study reversibility, we have per-
formed numerical simulations in 103 independent networks of
size N = 1.2×105 generated through Erdo¨s-Re´nyi algorithm.
For reduced cycles, that is, when the return points are far from
absorbing states (1−Nc(bmin)≫ 1, Nc(bmax)≫ 1) the pro-
cesses are reversible and the level of cooperation is indepen-
dent of the sign of the increase in b. Nevertheless, when return
points are close enough to the absorbing states (c(bmin) ≈
1, c(bmax) ≈ 0), ER networks exhibit irreversibility to a large
extent. In fact, once the level of cooperation reaches a tip-
ping point, all processes are irreversible. In particular, there
is a strong resilience of cooperation (defection) when increas-
ing (decreasing) the value of b. However, the backward and
forward transition curves are identical for intermediate val-
ues of cooperation. The proximity ǫ of the tipping points
c(bmin), c(bmax) to the absorbent states in both ends of the
cycle turns out to be similar: 1− c(bmin) = ǫ ≈ c(bmax) and,
for the networks size used, it takes on the value ǫ ≈ 2× 10−3.
As a result, once the population has reached a cooperation
level above (below) a tipping point, the system shows a reti-
cence to retrieve the past level of cooperation when the param-
eter b increases (decreases). This phenomenon is independent
of the particular ER network, being observed in all network
realizations. Figure 1 shows the level of cooperation 〈c〉 ver-
sus the temptation to defect b, averaged over 103 realizations
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FIG. 2: (color online) Cooperation level 〈c〉 versus the temptation to
defect b averaged over 100 SF networks (solid lines) and envelopes
(dotted lines). Red lines represent semi-cycles with increasing b and
blue lines represent semi-cycles with decreasing b. Only irreversible
realizations are shown. The network size is N = 1.2× 105. See the
text for further details.
in distinct ER networks. Different realizations show different
b-increasing and b-decreasing curves, whose envelopes are de-
picted as dotted lines in Figure 1. Remarkably, the dispersion
of the different curves is much larger for the b-decreasing di-
rection.
SCALE-FREE NETWORKS
Scale-free (SF) networks are graphs whose degree distri-
bution P (k) follows a power law, that is, P (k) ∼ ck−γ .
We ran simulations in 5 × 103 independent networks of size
N = 1.2 × 105 generated through the Baraba´si-Albert al-
gorithm. Although most of the SF networks show nearly re-
versible behavior, around 5% of networks show a strong hys-
teresis. Nevertheless, irreversibility in SF networks should not
be considered as a rare event: Increasing the network size
increases the proportion of networks that show irreversible
behavior. The explanation for this fact is that the use of
larger networks allows to approach closer the absorbing states
c = 0, 1 without getting stuck in them. Based on this ar-
gument, we have separated realizations showing a reversible
behavior from irreversible ones. In these latter cases, hystere-
sis shows up only for low values of b; in other words, when
cooperation is very small, backward and forward c(b) curves
are almost identical. Moreover, the behavior of the system
in b-increasing semi-cycles is always similar, the cooperation
level c(b) taking approximately the same value in all realiza-
tions, regardless of whether they are reversible or irreversible.
On the contrary, c(b) curves are different for different (irre-
versible) realizations in b-decreasing semi-cycles, and show a
substantially larger dispersion than those of ER networks.
The results of the average cooperation level 〈c〉 as a func-
tion of the temptation to defect b, for SF networks show-
ing irreversible behavior, are presented in figure 2. The re-
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FIG. 3: (color online) Cooperation level 〈c〉 versus the temptation to
defect b averaged over 100 SF networks (solid lines) and envelopes
(dotted lines). Red lines represent semicycles with increasing b and
blue lines represent semicycles with decreasing b. In this case, a
constraint has been considered: Nc > µ and N − Nc > µ. All
the realizations have been taken into account. The network size is
N = 1.2× 105 and µ = 10. See the text for further details.
turn points bmin, bmax were chosen such that c(bmax) =
1 − c(bmin) = ǫ, for a value of ǫ = 10−3. Note that, despite
the small value of ǫ, the network size N is large enough so
as to ensure that we are not dealing with pathological cases,
since a value c = 0.001 involves a number of cooperators
Nc = 120. In the same way, c = 0.999 implies 120 defector
nodes. As shown in envelopes (dotted lines), the degree of
irreversibility varies greatly from one realization to another.
Specifically, irreversibility depends on the particular network,
since for a given network repeated cycles share approximately
the same c(b) curves for a given (forward or backward) di-
rection. A most remarkable feature of the irreversibility in
SF networks is that, for irreversible network realizations, the
value of the temptation to defect needed to reach a coopera-
tion level of c = 10−3 is bmin < 1, that is to say, outside the
PD game range.
In order to validate (or refute) the hypothesis that most of
the studied SF networks do not show irreversibility because
the return points are not close enough to the tipping points,
we have addressed the problem through a modification of the
model: to avoid getting stuck in absorbing states (c = 0, 1),
now we add a constraint which keeps the minimum number of
cooperators and defectors above a given threshold µ. In par-
ticular, we add the condition that a node can switch its strat-
egy to defection (resp., cooperation) only if Nc > µ (resp.,
N − Nc > µ). Figure 3 shows the cooperation level c as a
function of the temptation to defect b, averaged over 100 dif-
ferent SF networks. The values of return points bmin, bmax
have been chosen such that Nc(bmax) = N −Nc(bmin) = µ,
for a value of µ = 20. In this case, all studied networks show
a strong hysteresis indicating that, once the return points have
been chosen close enough to the absorbing states, the process
is always irreversible.
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FIG. 4: (color online) Number ncc of cooperator clusters (blue, thick
lines) and relative size of main cooperator cluster Gc/N (red, thin
lines) in ER networks. Solid lines represent b-decreasing half-cycles
and dashed lines represent b-increasing half-cycles. The system size
is N = 1.2 × 105. We have averaged over 50 simulations.
MICROSCOPIC ROOTS
Previous studies [18–20, 22] have shown that, in the asymp-
totic states of the evolutionary dynamics of the PD game,
under the updating rule explained above (discrete replicator
rule), the network is generically partitioned into three sets
of nodes: Pure cooperators (nodes where cooperation has
reached fixation), pure defectors, and fluctuating strategists
(nodes where fixation is impossible so that defection and co-
operation alternate forever). Pure cooperators resist invasion
by grouping together in cooperator clusters, each of these
connected subgraphs keeping around it a cloud of fluctuating
strategists. The basis for an understanding of the irreversible
behavior in ER networks is found by looking along both (b-
increasing and b-decreasing) branches at the details of this mi-
croscopic organization of cooperation. In particular, in what
follows we pay attention to the number and size of pure coop-
erator clusters as a function of b. Figure 4 shows the averaged
relative size 〈Gc/N〉 of the largest cooperator cluster, and the
average 〈ncc〉 of the number of cooperator clusters versus the
temptation to defect b, in both semi-cycles for ER networks.
Let us first analyze the b-increasing semi-cycle. In typical
configurations near the absorbing state c = 1, pure coopera-
tors percolate the network forming a giant cooperator cluster
whose averaged relative size 〈Gc/N〉 ≃ 1. As the tempta-
tion to defect b increases, starting from such configurations,
the existence of a single very large cluster of pure cooperators
allows initially for a very efficient resilience to invasion by de-
fectors until a value of b ≃ 1.16 is reached. From there on, in-
vasion processes are greatly enhanced, thus inducing the frag-
mentation of the largest cluster: 〈Gc/N〉 decreases quickly,
the largest cluster give rise to an increasing number ncc of
small clusters of pure cooperators. At b ≃ 1.23, this quantity
reaches its maximum value ncc ≃ 160 and the largest cluster
size has been reduced to 〈Gc/N〉 ≃ 0.15. Further increase of
b reduces both the number of pure cooperator clusters and the
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FIG. 5: (color online) Relative size of the main cooperator cluster
Gc/N for reversible processes (dashed line, red) and irreversible
ones (solid line, black) in the b-decreasing semicycle (∆b < 0) on
SF networks. Averaged over the 100 different networks studied that
show irreversible behavior. The system size is N = 1.2 × 105.
size of the largest one: At b ≃ 1.8 basically only the largest
cluster remains with a very small size which keeps decreasing
further beyond the tipping point (typically found at b ≥ 2).
Now we analyze the b-decreasing semicycle. Back from
the typical configuration reached past the tipping point near
the absorbing state c = 0, when decreasing the temptation
value b the very small size of the remaining pure cooperator
cluster cannot benefit (i.e., enlarge its size) enough from the
cooperative fluctuations nearby; correspondingly the level of
cooperation 〈c〉 remains well below the values observed for
the b-increasing branch. It is not until a value of b ≃ 1.6 is
reached, that 〈Gc/N〉 starts a significant increase. Simulta-
neously, some cooperative fluctuations in the cloud of fluc-
tuating agents form independent (separated) small cooperator
clusters, so that ncc also starts to significantly deviate from
zero. At around b ≃ 1.5 both 〈Gc/N〉 and ncc (as well as the
average level of cooperation 〈c〉) show already values that are
very close to those exhibited by the b-increasing branch. How-
ever, once reached the value b ≃ 1.23, where ncc has its maxi-
mum value (and, as explained previously, the fragmentation of
the largest cluster of pure cooperators reached an end in the b-
increasing branch), a further decrease in b leads to an increase
of 〈Gc/N〉, and a concomitant decrease of ncc due to the con-
nection of small cooperator clusters to the largest one. These
processes take place at a slower pace than the correspond-
ing fragmentation occurring for the b-increasing branch. The
consequence is that the values of the cooperation level in this
range of b for the b-decreasing branch, are significantly lower
than those for the b-increasing semi-cycle. Note that though
the values of 〈Gc/N〉, ncc, and 〈c〉 in the range of intermedi-
ate 1.23 ≤ b ≤ 1.5 values are very similar in both branches,
the system keeps memory of the path followed, demonstrat-
ing the importance of the particular topological details of the
organization of cooperator clusters.
A significant difference, regarding the microscopic organi-
5zation of cooperation, between ER and SF networks, is the
observation first reported in [18] that for SF networks pure
cooperators group together in a single cluster, while in ER
networks they are disaggregated into several cooperator clus-
ters for generic values of b. In our simulations here we are
using network sizes that are larger than those used in [18] by
a factor of 30, and for SF networks we have observed nodes
that, though being isolated from the main cooperator cluster,
remain cooperators during observational time scales. Strictly
speaking they are not pure cooperators, for the probability of
invasion by the defective strategy is not strictly zero (in all the
cases analyzed), though it turns out to be exceedingly small,
due to the large connectivity (degree) of these nodes. These
quasi-pure cooperators appear in both branches; also, they are
present in reversible paths, i.e., those where return points are
chosen before reaching tipping points. For a network size
of N = 1.2 × 105 its number is never larger than 8 for b-
increasing branches, and not larger than 14 for b-decreasing
branches. Their contribution both direct and indirect (through
the cloud of fluctuating strategists each one keeps nearby) to
the level c of cooperation can be considered as negligible. Still
one cannot discard a priori an eventual role they might play
in the reshaping of the main cooperator cluster during the hys-
teresis cycle of particular irreversible realizations.
In figure 5 we plot the relative size of the cooperator cluster
〈Gc/N〉 averaged over 100 irreversible realizations for both
forward and backward branches of the cycle. Contrary to
what happens for ER networks at high values of the tempta-
tion to defect, when starting to decrease it from bmin, the size
of the cooperator cluster in SF networks initially follows very
closely the values of the forward branch until b ≃ 2.5. How-
ever, significant differences in the average cooperation value
〈c〉 (see figure 2) are already noticeable from b ≃ 3, indicating
that the contribution from the cloud of fluctuating strategies is
lower for the backward branch. When further decreasing b
down from b ≃ 2.5, the averaged size of the cooperator clus-
ter takes on values progressively lower than in the b-increasing
branch. This agrees nicely with the observation just made in
previously regarding the cloud of fluctuating strategies, for the
growth of the cooperator cluster originates from the coopera-
tive fluctuations in its frontier, and thus the strength of these
fluctuations determines the pace of the cluster size growth.
The difference between forward and backward branches per-
sists down to the tipping point, which somewhat surprisingly
occurs for values of b outside the PD game range.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the evolutionary dynamics of
a classical PD game on top of complex homogeneous and het-
erogeneous networks. Although there are many results avail-
able in the literature, here we have addressed a problem that
can be of interest in real settings. Admittedly, to the best of
our knowledge, all known results have dealt with situations in
which the average levels of cooperation reported are obtained
by averaging over different initial conditions for fixed values
of the model parameters. However, real system are continu-
ously evolving from a given micro-state − characterized by
a distribution of strategists − to another one driven by both
the internal dynamics (the evolutionary rules) and the external
conditions. The latter can be ultimately modeled as if the en-
tries of the payoff matrix were changed. For instance, in some
conditions, the pressure towards cooperation could be greater
than in other situations or the other way around. This means
that parameters such as the temptation to defect could change
continuously and that such a change takes place without reset-
ing the system, i.e., the initial condition is the previous steady
state of the system.
Our results show that the generic existence of different sta-
tionary strategic configurations for the evolutionary dynam-
ics of the PD game on networks (under the discrete replicator
strategy updating rule) allows for a hysteresis-like behavior
of the average cooperation level when the model parameter is
quasi-statically varied. However, our results on random com-
plex networks indicate that the observation of hysteresis is
greatly conditioned by the range of variation of the parameter.
Unless the temptation to defect b is brought to a large (resp.
small) enough value, so as the cooperation level reaches an
almost zero (resp. unity) value, the behavior is perfectly re-
versible.
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